Perspectives:

Smart Subsidies

by Jonathan J. Morduch

Smart subsidy might seem like a contradiction in
terms to many microfinance experts. Worries about
the dangers of excessive subsidization have driven
microfinance conversations since the movement first
gained steam in the 1980s. From then on, the goal
of serving the poor has been twined with the goal of
long-term financial self-sufficiency on the part of
microbanks; aiming for profitability became part of
what it means to practice good microfinance.
Much of the excitement around microfinance stems from the possibility of
achieving massive scale through highly efficient operations. And one of the
fears of relying on subsidies is that it can undercut both scale and efficiency.
A beginning point in considering smart subsidies is recognizing that the same
forces driving efficient outcomes in free markets—hard budget constraints,
clear bottom lines, and competitive pressure, for example—can also be
deployed in contexts with subsidies. If deployed well, there are circumstances
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in which subsidies can increase the
spurs institutions to innovate, cut
scale of microfinance outreach, access costs, and improve products and
to commercial finance, and depth of
services. The push for profitability
outreach to the poor. To make this
attracts new investors into the sector,
happen, donors and recipients need
reinforcing calls for professionalism,
to be aware of the opportunities and
transparency, and good governance.
constraints. By the same token, over
None of this is likely in settings
reliance on subsidies and poorly
dominated by subsidy.
designed subsidies can limit scale
The recently reformulated
and undermine incentives critical to
set of donor guidelines of the
building strong institutions.
Consultative Group to Assist the
The idea of smart subsidy springs
Poor (CGAP) on “good practice
from the premise that subsidies
in microfinance”a begins with the
are neither inherently useful nor
idea that “microfinance can pay for
inherently flawed. Rather, their
itself, and must do so if it is to reach
effectiveness depends on design
very large numbers of people.”1 The
guidelines push the point further:
and implementation. Smart
“Unless microfinance providers charge
subsidies maximize social benefits
enough to cover their costs, they
while minimizing distortions
will always be limited by the scarce
and misplaced targeting. The
and uncertain supply of subsidies
discussion below emphasizes the
from donors and governments.” The
way well-designed subsidies can
appropriate role of subsidies is thus
potentially “crowd in” other donor
minimal according to the guidelines.
funds. Particular emphasis is put
For the most part, subsidies are
on subsidies that are transparent,
limited to start-up funding of new
rule bound, and time limited. One
institutions, after which they should
further step is to institute regular,
be withdrawn. As the guidelines
rigorous statistical evaluations of
state, “Donor subsidies should be
program impacts. Only then can
temporary start-up support designed
donors evaluate the social returns
to get an institution to the point
on their investments and have the
where it can tap private funding
information to improve impacts.
sources, such as deposits.”
This essay focuses on possibilities,
We have to be careful, then,
not new guidelines. Ultimately, the
in opening conversations about
push for profitability will continue
broader uses of subsidies that may
to be critical for microfinance. The
go substantially beyond “temporary
question is whether a subset of
start-up support.” But the risks of
institutions can benefit from using
not discussing subsidy openly can
subsidies strategically to promote
be large, too. For one thing, using
social objectives not otherwise
subsidies continues to be an ongoing
possible. If so, how?
part of the financial strategies of
Opening Conversations
many microfinance institutions
Long-term sustainability is
(MFIs), including institutions well
critical for microfinance. The desire
beyond their “temporary start-up”
to escape ongoing subsidization
phase. The MicroBanking Bulletin

of July 2003, for example, shows
that 66 out of 124 microlenders
surveyed were financially sustainable,
a rate just over 50 percent. For
microlenders focusing on the low
end, just 18 of 49 were financially
sustainable, a 37 percent rate. On
one hand, the data show that even
programs reaching poorer clients can
do so while covering the full costs
of transactions. On the other hand,
the norm remains subsidization,
particularly for those programs
working in remote areas and seeking
to reach the poorest households.2
Another reason for opening
conversations is that subsidization
is not likely to end soon. Social
investors are starting to make their
mark in the sector, for example, and
many are driven by the possibility of
trading profit for demonstrated social
impact. Philanthropic foundations
work on the same premise. Many
social investors hope to strengthen
microfinance as a poverty reduction
tool, and some MFIs have made a
conscious effort to reach the “very
poor” individuals highlighted by the
UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).
Recent studies show that microfinance mainly serves moderately
poor and low-income households,
though with weaker outreach to the
very poor. Studies completed as part
of legislation mandated by the U.S.
Congress, for example, show that
in Peru, Kazakhstan, and Uganda,
roughly 15 percent of microfinance
customers were among the “poorest
half ” of the poor, as defined by
the official poverty lines in their
countries. In Bangladesh, 44 percent
were found to be among the poorest,
a figure lower than expected. Not
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everyone is equally concerned about
the plight of the poorest or agrees
that microfinance is the best tool to
reach the poorest, but the failure to
achieve deeper outreach is a growing
policy concern, especially in the
UN system.3 One question raised
is whether smart subsidies can help
in achieving social goals, including
poverty reduction and improvements
in levels of health and education
alongside better finance.
A third reason for an opening to
broader deployments of subsidies
arises from analytical concerns. The
propositions put forward against
subsidies are best seen as rules of
thumb and, as time passes, the need
for analytical nuance becomes clearer.
With greater analytical clarity, the
limits and possibilities for efficient
subsidization have emerged. In
particular, four important lessons
have been learned:
1. Subsidized credit does not
equal “cheap credit”—credit at
interest rates well below rates
available elsewhere in the local credit
market—and the poor incentives
that ensue. The early attacks on
subsidized state banks centered
justifiably on their cheap credit
policies—interest rates on loans that
were sometimes negative in inflationadjusted terms and small if positive.
But the jump from criticizing cheap
credit to criticizing other kinds of
subsidies has been recognized as
being too great a leap. Today, cheap
credit is a well-understood problem,
and a first principle of smart
subsidies is to avoid cheap credit.
2. Profitability does not equal
efficiency. New data show that
efficiency—lean management
structures, low unit loan costs,
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and high numbers of loans per
staff member—depends largely on
giving staff the right incentives
and using information well. The
MicroBanking Bulletin, for example,
shows highly efficient institutions
that are subsidized, as well as some
that are for-profit. It also shows
for-profit institutions that are not
particularly efficient. Consider
ASA in Bangladesh, for example.
ASA has implemented innovative,
cost-cutting management practices
that have made it among the most
efficient lenders in the world. But
ASA achieved the cost reductions
during a period in which it was also
receiving soft loans from Palli KarmaSahayak Foundation (PKSF) a local
apex organization. It was modestly
subsidized, but highly efficient.4
3. Profitability does not equal
sustainability, as judged by the
ability to survive over time. Consider
a program that enjoys a temporary
monopoly, charges high rates, and
posts profits. It will be “financially
sustainable” according to the
standard measures. But the bank
is vulnerable to new entrants who
may skim off good clients and
undermine the long-term viability
of the business. In comparison, a
well-run but subsidized microbank
may well be more viable in the long
run. A realistic long-term strategy is
what matters most, and this is not
reflected in snapshot measures of
current profitability.
4. Profitability does not guarantee
access to commercial finance, nor
does lack of profitability necessarily
foreclose such access. Profitability
does not guarantee large scale, nor
does subsidization necessarily limit
it. In the United States, for example,

most universities and hospitals
operate on a nonprofit basis, but
many obtain commercial financing
for parts of their operations.
Similarly, MFIs routinely mix
funding sources—some subsidized,
some at commercial rates.
While these arguments point
to the possibility for a broader
consideration of subsidy, how and
when should it be done?
“Crowding In” & “Crowding Out”

Donor funds typically constitute
just one part of overall financing for
a development finance institution.
Given this context, donors use their
resources most effectively when the
funds act as catalysts for additional
resources or social impacts. One
important idea is that smart subsidies
should “crowd in” funding where
possible, rather than crowd it out.
Providing guarantees (or offering
subordinated debt in which the
donor is willing to be repaid after
other lenders are repaid) is a good
example. Consider the case of a
recent securitization deal between
India’s largest private bank, ICICI,
and the microlender SHARE
Microfin Ltd.5 For ICICI to agree
to pay for a portfolio of 42,500
loans served by SHARE (SHARE
continues to service the loans, but
interest and principal go to ICICI),
ICICI required protection against
unexpected loan losses. ICICI
demanded an 8 percent first-loss
guarantee. If customers refused to
repay SHARE, ICICI did not want
to be left vulnerable. The eventual
deal emerged when the Grameen
Foundation funded most of the
required guarantee by giving SHARE

$325,000 in capital. SHARE, for
its part, contributed about $20,000.
The loan portfolio was valued at $4.3
million, so the guarantee amounted
to $344,000, or 8 percent.
The Grameen Foundation’s
$325,000 was thus used to “crowd
in” an additional $4.3 million from
ICICI. While ICICI receives the
profit from its shares, SHARE gains
by spreading its risk and getting
an immediate capital infusion. In
this case, the subsidy, in the form
of a loan guarantee, helped attract
commercial capital and finalize the
deal.
The experience undercuts the
simple idea that subsidization and
commercial capital are at odds. Here,
in fact, they are complementary.
Guarantees are powerful not
just because they reduce risk for
other potential investors. They can
also be powerful when they signal
information about the recipient’s
strength and efficiency. Presumably,
the Grameen Foundation went into
the deal with SHARE and ICICI
after reckoning that the risks were
modest. By putting their money
behind that belief, the Grameen
Foundation could signal to outsiders
that SHARE was an institution in
which it is worth investing.
Similarly, making a substantial
loan to an institution can signal
a belief in the strength of that
institution, and the willingness to
accept subordinated debt goes even
further. In the decision to make a
grant versus a loan or guarantee, the
two latter options mean beating risk.
Rather than avoiding risk, the donor
can signal his belief in the strength
of the institution by deliberately
accepting risk, and that signal may

Not everyone is
equally concerned
about the plight
of the poorest
or agrees that
microfinance is
the best tool
to reach the
poorest,

but the
failure to
achieve deeper
outreach is a
growing policy
concern.
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If start-up
subsidies are
appropriate when
an institution is
just building its
first branches, why
would they be less
appropriate when
the institution
chooses to expand
to a wholly new
area where it has
to build up, in
large part, from
scratch?
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help attract commercial investors.
The other way that donors crowd
in other investors is by providing
broad oversight of the recipient
institution and perhaps even joining
the board. If the donors have a strong
reputation for prudent leadership
and oversight, their involvement
can provide additional incentives
for other investors, even commercial
investors, to participate. Again, the
donors not only bring their own
resources but also the possibility of
attracting other investors.
Start-up Subsidies
Institutions

for

The CGAP’s donor guidelines
on good practice in microfinance
privileges start-up subsidies for
institutions, limited to the first five
to ten years of operation. Start-up
subsidies have the advantage of
being time limited and relatively
transparent. By restricting the
subsidies to a limited period, the
fear of dependency is diminished.
This rule-based aspect of the subsidy
reduces the weak incentives created
by soft budget constraints. For
example, the recipients will not face
the consequence of failing to achieve
financial targets. Here, instead, the
donor makes clear that the subsidies
are only available for a short time,
after which the institution is
expected to become self-sufficient.
A common goal is that the subsidy
allows institutions to immediately
charge customers fees and interest
rates at levels that will become
feasible only once the institution
reaches a larger scale. In the start-up
stage, the subsidies make up the
shortfalls, and thus prevent the full
costs of the operation from being

passed on to customers in the form
of higher fees and interest rates.
The logic is clear. But if start-up
subsidies are appropriate when an
institution is just building its first
branches, why would they be less
appropriate when the institution
chooses to expand to a wholly new
area where it has to build up, in large
part, from scratch? When building
the first branch, much learning-bydoing must be done, of course, and
the subsidies are particularly helpful.
Later expansion should be easier,
and a prudent institution will put
aside a part of current earnings to
fund future expansion. All the same,
a donor may be able to hasten the
expansion process by broadening the
notion of “start-up subsidy” to cover
major expansions, even after the first
five to ten years of an institution’s
existence, without creating ongoing
incentive problems.
Start-up Subsidies

for

Customers

One of the reasons start-up
subsidies are justified is that an
institution takes time to achieve
scale economies. To a degree, this
is also true when working with new
clients—at any stage in the life of
an institution. New clients generally
start with the smallest loans, and
such loans tend to have high
transaction costs per unit.
At Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh,
for example, a study several years
ago showed that initial loans to new
customers were so small—just taka
(Tk) 2,500—that BRAC lost money
servicing them at the given interest
rate of 15 percent, charged on a flat
basis, roughly equivalent to a 30
percent per year effective interest rate.

At loan sizes of Tk4,000 and more,
BRAC recovered costs with interest
earnings, but not at Tk2,500. BRAC
calculated that it cross-subsidized at
a rate of Tk225 on a Tk2,500 loan,
suggesting that BRAC would have
needed to raise effective interest
rates by about 9 percent for small
loans. BRAC’s management, though,
feared that effective interest rates of
40 percent would be unaffordable
for the poorest borrowers and could
undermine social goals.
The subsidies, cross-subsidies in
this case, were not associated with
cheap credit and all of the negative
trappings that association entails.
Instead, they were strategically
deployed and targeted to aid the
poorest customers. They allowed the
customers to begin the first stages
of a relationship that was ultimately
sustainable.
BRAC took the idea a large step
further in its Income Generation
for Vulnerable Group Development
Program (IGVGD), which subsidized
potential clients who were not yet
When the training program was
ready to borrow from microlenders at completed, households were expected
“market” interest rates. First, BRAC
to “graduate” into BRAC’s regular
programs.
argued that these customers can
The program focused on
benefit from an intensive period of
households headed by women or
training and time to build businesses
“abandoned” women who owned
to a minimum scale. IGVGD was
less than one-half acre of land and
built around a food aid program
that earned less than Tk300 (US$6)
that the World Food Programme
per month. The training included
sponsored. The resources of the
skills like livestock raising, vegetable
food aid program were integrated
cultivation, and fishery management.
into a program that provided both
After an 80 percent success rate in a
eighteen months of food subsidies
pilot program with 750 households,
and six months of skills training,
BRAC rolled out the program
with the aim of developing new
throughout Bangladesh, and IGVGD
livelihoods for the chronically poor.
was serving 1.2 million households
Participants were also expected
by 2000.6
to start saving regularly to build
The subsidies at BRAC are not
discipline and an initial capital base.

large in the scheme of things. Taken
together, Hashemi (2001) estimates
that IGVGD subsidies amount to
about Tk6,725 (about US$135 in
2001) per participant. The largest
component is Tk6,000 for the food
subsidy, provided by the World
Food Programme, and the remainder
is about Tk500 for training costs
and Tk225 to support making
small initial loans to participants.
The first loans are typically about
US$50. For US$135 per participant,
BRAC aims to forever remove the
need for participants to require
future handouts. To achieve that
aim, efforts to ensure sustainable
impacts must be implemented and
success rates improved. But even as it
stands, the IGVGD is an important
model for other programs. BRAC has
launched a new initiative, Targeting
the Ultra Poor, that builds on the
IGVGD and combines training
and subsidy for the very poor. The
question ultimately is whether this
deployment of subsidies generates
sufficient social value for the cost,
and whether it generates more
social value than alternative social
investments?
Providing Complementary Inputs

The IGVGD began with the
recognition that the problems and
constraints faced by poor households
are often multiple and overlapping,
including the lack of access to
adequate health care, skills, and
education.
  A different kind of time-limited,
transparent, rule-bound intervention
involves the delivery of nonfinancial
services to current customers. Consider Pro Mujer, a microlender in
Latin America that is committed to
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improving the health and economic
opportunities of poor women and
their families. Based on feedback
from their clients, Pro Mujer’s branch
in Nicaragua introduced an array
of health services focused on cancer
prevention and detection, self-help
groups aimed at combating family
violence, and health counseling by
clients trained as health promoters.
In 2005, Pro Mujer, Nicaragua,
began an innovative strategy to take
health services straight to customers’
communities. Health educators now
travel by motorcycle to communities,
offering pap smears and consultation
services. In 2004 alone, 199 cases
of cancer were detected among Pro
Mujer’s customers in Nicaragua, and
the women were led to treatment.
Such integrated models of banking
coupled with social or other services
are not appropriate for every MFI
or every location, or even most
institutions and locations. Nor
are they simple to implement. But
Pro Mujer has demonstrated that
they are possible to implement
well and that they are meaningful
for clients. There is no reason that
customers cannot pay for most of
the health services on their own.
But even though Pro Mujer is
strongly committed to financial selfsufficiency where full cost-recovery
is impossible, strategic subsidization
can improve health service quality
and quantity for customers without
distorting financial mechanisms.
Demonstrating Impact

In general, subsidies should
be time limited and rule bound.
Practitioners know that the
availability of subsidies can be
uncertain and unreliable. Dep-
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ending on ongoing flows, subsidy is
not likely to be a viable long-term
proposition. But that still leaves
many places where smart subsidy
may help philanthropic individuals
and donors achieve social objectives
that are not readily achievable when
working through strictly for-profit
institutions.
Deploying subsidies, though,
raises the bar on evaluations.
The microfinance industry has
made great strides by developing
and insisting on the use of clear,
rigorous financial measures. The
same must be true for subsidies. If
smart subsidies are deployed in the
hope of producing demonstrable
social impacts, those impacts
should be measured using rigorous
statistical analyses, with solid
control and treatment groups and
attention to measuring causal
relationships. Every intervention
need not be rigorously evaluated,
but at present there is almost no
careful evaluation and it is time to
shift the balance.
Microfinance experts have
worried, justifiably, that
badly designed subsidies not
only undermine the financial
performance of microlenders but
can also undermine social impacts
by limiting scale and the quality of
services. If subsidies are deployed
in the name of improved social
impacts, donors should make it a
priority to measure the degree to
which they generate important net
impacts for customers.

Endnotes
1. The guidelines incorporate the views of a broad range of donor
staff working to support inclusive financial systems (CGAP
2004).
2. Definitions of low-end vary. The MicroBanking Bulletin’s
definition of institutions reaching the low-end of the population
includes those with an average loan size of less than 20 percent
of GNP per capita or less than US$150. Some of the programs
in the bulletin are young and in their start-up phase, but even
established programs use subsidies.
3. Data are from Morduch (2005). Some current microfinance
customers most likely started out among the very poor and
have since grown less poor. Data on incoming microfinance
customers—rather than current customers in aggregate—would
show higher levels of poverty if that is true. Also, these data are
from just four countries and pertain to relatively small samples.
4. For more on ASA’s innovations, see Nimal Fernando and
Richard Meyer (2002).
5. Details are taken from Chowdhry, et al (2005).
6. The data and follow-up study reported here are from research
in Imran Matin and David Hulme (2003).
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